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Abstract
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company adopted a policy from 1910 onward of ro-
tating its external audit ﬁrm every year, and later every several years, until the 1950s,
when it ﬁnally consented to appoint a permanent auditor. This practice of audit ﬁrm
rotation was exceptional, if not unique, among U.S. companies. It is the purpose of this
article to review this policy and to present evidence of the companys reasons for its
adoption and, in the end, the decision to appoint a permanent auditor.
 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
An issue that has come to the fore in the wake of the collapse of Enron has
been whether companies should be required to rotate their external audit ﬁrms
after speciﬁed periods of time. Prior to Enron, the topic had been discussed
occasionally within the U.S. accounting profession, but the policy recom-
mendation had always been not to impose such a requirement (see, e.g.,
Commission on Auditors Responsibilities, 1978, pp. 108–109; Division for
CPA Firms, 1992). But, following Enron, mandatory audit ﬁrm rotation was
advocated in Congressional testimony by Arthur Levitt, Jr., former chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); former SEC chief ac-
countant Lynn E. Turner; and Charles A. Bowsher on behalf of the Public
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www.elsevier.com/locate/jaccpubpolOversight Board, which he chaired; among others.
1 Audit ﬁrm rotation would
be imposed by the Truth and Accountability in Accounting Act of 2002, in-
troduced on March 14, 2002 by Rep. John D. Dingell (Democrat, Michigan)
and others.
2 Many state and local government agencies in the U.S. adhere to
audit ﬁrm rotation. The practice is required by law in several other countries.
3
The chairman of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission has
embraced the ‘‘principle’’ of audit ﬁrm rotation, and a Treasury select com-
mittee in the U.K. has recommended that the government require mandatory
auditor and audit ﬁrm rotation.
4
The principal argument for mandatory rotation of the audit ﬁrm is that it
would contribute to enhanced auditor independence vis- a a-vis the client com-
pany, and the principal argument raised against mandatory rotation is the
higher cost and the substantial risks confronting the audit ﬁrm during the
initial year of an audit engagement.
5
The almost universal practice of U.S. publicly traded companies has been to
reappoint their external audit ﬁrm as an almost unquestioned practice at
shareholder meetings. Only where signiﬁcant diﬀerences arise between the
company and the audit ﬁrm over accounting or auditing issues does one see the
replacement of one audit ﬁrm by another.
Yet one major U.S. enterprise, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (‘‘Du
Pont’’), systematically rotated its external audit ﬁrm between 1910 and 1954.
6
Indeed, from 1911 to 1928, with only one exception, Du Pont changed its audit
ﬁrm every year. Haskins & Sells and Price, Waterhouse & Co. held the majority
1 The prepared remarks by these three individuals were made in hearings before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Aﬀairs on February 12 and 26 and March 19, 2002,
respectively. Bowsher said he was conveying the view of the Public Oversight Board.
2 H.R. 3970, 107th Congress, 2nd Session.
3 Italy currently has a statutory requirement for audit ﬁrm rotation every nine years, and Austria
recently approved a law that requires audit ﬁrm rotation by the end of six years. In 1989, Spain
adopted legislation mandating audit ﬁrm rotation by the end of nine years, but the legislation was
repealed in 1997, one year before it would have had a practical eﬀect. Greece requires audit ﬁrm
rotation every six years for public sector entities, and beginning in March 2002 the Singaporean
central bank has required that banks incorporated in Singapore change their audit ﬁrms at least
every ﬁve years.
4 See Knott (2002), Mackintosh (2002, pp. 5–6), and Perry (2002). David Knott is chairman and
Ian Mackintosh was then the chief accountant of the Australian Securities & Investments
Commission.
5 For a discussion of the international debate and experience as well as a recitation of the
arguments for and against mandatory rotation, see Catanach and Walker (1999, pp. 43–48). Also
see the recent report of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (Mandatory
Rotation of Audit Firms, 2002).
6 Du Pont published its ﬁrst annual report carrying an audit ﬁrms certiﬁcate for the year 1910.
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the ﬁscal years 1910 to the present is as follows:
7
1910 Price, Waterhouse & Company
1911 The Audit Company of New York
1912 Haskins & Sells
1913 The Audit Company of New York
1914 Haskins & Sells
1915 The Audit Company of New York
1916 Haskins & Sells
1917 The Audit Company of New York
1918–19 Haskins & Sells
1920 Ernst & Ernst
1921 Price, Waterhouse & Co.
1922 Haskins & Sells
1923 Price, Waterhouse & Co.
1924 Haskins & Sells
1925 Price, Waterhouse & Co.
1926 Haskins & Sells
1927 Price, Waterhouse & Co.
1928–29 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
1930–38 Price, Waterhouse & Co.
1939–42 Haskins & Sells
1943–45 Arthur Andersen & Co.
1946–53 Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery
Since 1954 Price, Waterhouse & Co.
8
2. Du Pont’s reason for audit ﬁrm rotation becomes evident
2.1. Exchange of letters in 1922
Du Pont says nothing in its annual reports about this policy of rotating the
external audit ﬁrm.
9 But internal correspondence throws light on the reason
7 Price, Waterhouse & Co. and Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery are today part of
PricewaterhouseCoopers; Haskins & Sells is part of Deloitte & Touche; Ernst & Ernst is part of
Ernst & Young; and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. is part of KPMG. The Audit Company of New
York, a corporation, was acquired in 1932 by R.G. Rankin & Co., which in 1955 merged with Price
Waterhouse & Co. (Partner Retires, 1958). It was said to be ‘‘the single most signiﬁcant merger in
PWs history,’’ because of the important clients it brought to the ﬁrm (Allen and McDermott, 1993,
p. 117).
8 In 1951, the ﬁrm removed the comma from its name.
9 One reason for omitting mention of this matter is that, until the 1940s or 1950s, it was the
president, not the board of directors or the stockholders, who appointed the external audit ﬁrm.
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23, 1922, Frank G. Tallman, a director, a member of the executive committee,
and a longtime member of the upper management of Du Pont, wrote as fol-
lows:
10
Referring to the matter of policy of changing auditors each year, I
state this has been done in the past largely because Mr. P.S. du Pont
favored it and because the basic principle governing having auditors
at all seems to indicate that the proper result would be more fully
obtained by changing auditors annually.
If I have the correct idea of the purpose of an annual audit it is that
we may have:
(a) a certiﬁcate of reliable, capable, independent, and disinterested
accountants that our books are correct, that they have been
properly kept, and that the balance sheet and proﬁt and loss ac-
count fairly set forth the ﬁnancial position of the Company;
(b) this to be attached to the annual report for the information and
beneﬁt of all stockholders, bankers, investors, and others inter-
ested in the true condition of the Company.
In order to secure the foregoing result it would seem that the audi-
tors should be entirely separate and divorced from any immediately
preceding connection with our Company. Auditors as I see it are
‘‘check-ups’’,such as National Bank examiners; Directors appointed
to count over and report on securities in the custody of our Trea-
surer; checking up magazine stocks; counting cash and going over
accounts of our branch oﬃces; requests from chartered accountants
to depositors in and borrowers from banks as to the condition of
their accounts and collateral on any certain date, etc., etc.
If I am correct in the foregoing our annual audit should be made by
chartered public accountants who did not make the previous annual
10 Accession 1662, Box 7, Folder C-44 in the Du Pont Archive, Hagley Museum and Library.
These materials have been quoted by courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library. All of the letters
cited below are also in this holding. Tallman wrote on Du Pont stationery bearing the title of vice-
president, but, according to Chandler and Salsbury (1971, p. 429), he was one of several ‘‘valued
old hands’’ who were retired from line administration and the executive committee in 1919. Pierre
S. du Pont, mentioned in Tallmans letter, relinquished the Du Pont presidency in 1919 and was
succeeded by Ir e en e ee du Pont. In 1919, Ir e en e ee du Pont designated Tallman as the company oﬃcer
who was to engage the external auditor each year.
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the year to be audited, on tax matters or otherwise.
In the same letter, Tallman explained why an exception was made in 1919,
when Haskins & Sells was retained for a second year. He wrote that, after
conferring with Ir e en e ee du Pont, ‘‘I made an arrangement with Haskins & Sells,
who were our auditors for the preceding year, the main reason being that there
was expected to be so much diﬃculty and so large an amount of work con-
nected with closing up war work and accounts, that it seemed best to waive the
desirability of a diﬀerent auditor in order to partially relieve the great con-
gestion in work of our accounting department at that time.’’ The annual ro-
tation of audit ﬁrms resumed in 1920.
Tallmans letter was precipitated by one dated June 16 from the Comp-
troller, James B. Eliason, addressed to Walter S. Carpenter, Jr.,
11 the Trea-
surer, in which, among other things, Eliason questioned the wisdom of the
annual rotation policy:
While I hold no brief for Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Company,
and fully recognize that there are a number of other auditing con-
cerns in this country who undoubtedly can serve us in an equally
satisfactory and eﬃcient manner, and whose reputation and stand-
ing are equal to that of Price, Waterhouse & Company, I wish to
express my conviction that the Companys policy of changing audi-
tors each year is without any particular merit and is expensive. A
new auditing concern, for instance for 1922, would be obliged to
cover to a considerable extent the same ground which has already
been covered by Price, Waterhouse & Company in their work for
1921 and they would be without the knowledge of where to go
and how to acquire information which Price, Waterhouse & Com-
pany, by reason of their familiarity gained during the last audit,
would be in a position to get without any lost motion.
It should also be remembered that Price, Waterhouse & Company
are at present, and will undoubtedly be throughout the balance of
this year, associated with us on our tax problems, and that there
is some advantage to us in having the same people who are working
on our tax problems also auditing our accounts, as since the
accounts and the tax problems are inseparable, I cannot help but
11 Carpenter went on to become the President of the company in 1940. Carpenter thus became
the ﬁrst President of the company who was not himself a du Pont (apart from Hamilton M.
Barksdale, who was acting President in 1912–13), yet his brother, R.R.M. Carpenter, was married
to the youngest sister of the brothers Pierre, Ir e en e ee and Lammot du Pont.
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making the audit for 1922.
Carpenter, in a brief letter to Ir e en e ee du Pont dated June 17, said that ‘‘I
heartily subscribe’’ to Eliasons view, and he added, ‘‘The importance of the
Price, Waterhouse association from the standpoint of Government taxes is
diﬃcult to exaggerate.’’ In his reply, dated June 23, Tallman conceded that
Price, Waterhouse & Co. had been the auditor of United States Steel Corpo-
ration since its organization in 1901, and that ‘‘some large companies have
continuous audits for which it would seem to be desirable to have the same
auditors year after year.’’ Yet he said that he was not in agreement with the
views of the Comptroller or Treasurer, but that they ‘‘may wish to put both
sides of the matter before the Finance Committee.’’
Ir e en e ee du Pont settled the matter in a letter to Carpenter dated June 29:
It seems to me that without having the least mis-trust of you or Mr.
Eliason, that good auditing should require a ﬁrm who could not be
criticized by reason of any other connection with the Treasurers
Department, and as Price, Waterhouse & Co. are engaged as ex-
perts by the Treasurers Dept., they should not be used at the pre-
sent time for that reason also.
The reason given by Ir e en e ee Du Pont raises interesting questions about the
scope of non-audit services that an audit ﬁrm should render to an audit client.
3. Du Pont modiﬁes its policy of rotating its audit ﬁrm
3.1. Eliason’s skepticism toward annual rotation secures favor
F.G. Tallman made a decision in 1928 to experiment with the same audit
ﬁrm (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.) in consecutive years. In a letter dated
April 28, 1928 to Lammot du Pont, who had become President in 1926, he
wrote, ‘‘If there is any virtue in a diversiﬁcation of auditors we ought to dis-
cover something at the end of this year.’’ The result of the experiment must
have been positive, because, with the support of J.B. Eliason, Price, Water-
house & Co. (‘‘PW’’) was retained as the companys auditor for nine consec-
utive years, from 1930 to 1938. In a letter to F.G. Tallman dated March 6,
1931, Lammot du Pont wrote, ‘‘It is my recollection that, from the standpoint
of eﬃciency and intelligent handling, Price-Waterhouse & Company are the
ﬁrst choice of our Treasurers Oﬃce. I see no reason why we should not retain
Price, Waterhouse & Company for another year.’’ Eliason, who as Comptroller
had opposed the policy of annually rotating the audit ﬁrm, had become
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Lammot du Pont wrote a similar letter to Tallman on March 7, 1932, leading
to a further reappointment of PW.
3.2. Du Pont resumes rotation after PW’s long tenure
In 1939, after PW had completed its ninth consecutive year as Du Ponts
auditor, the company decided to change auditors. However, PW was con-
cerned over a ‘‘misperception’’ at the coincidence of being rotated oﬀ the Du
Pont audit in 1939, shortly after the auditing scandal erupted at McKesson &
Robbins, whose audit ﬁrm was none other than PW (Allen and McDermott,
1993, p. 146). Even though J.B. Eliason was still the Du Pont Treasurer, the
views of the du Pont family continued to support the policy of audit ﬁrm ro-
tation, and apparently nine years for one audit ﬁrm was regarded as too much
of a departure from the rotation policy. In a letter to Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., the
Chairman of General Motors Corporation (in which Du Pont held a sub-
stantial investment), dated February 16, 1939, Lammot du Pont, still the
President, wrote as follows, in which he cited
ﬁve objectives to be accomplished by an audit by independent pub-
lic accountants.
(a) Check the accuracy of the accounting work done.
(b) Criticise and improve accounting practices in accordance with
general accounting practice.
(c) Discover any error which is in the rank and ﬁle of management.
(d) Discover any irregularity in the higher personnel.
(e) Prevent or expose collusion among oﬃcers.
Items (a) and (c), he said, fall within the province of the internal audit,
items (b) and (d) ‘‘will be covered by any independent auditor of good rep-
utation,’’ and item (e) ‘‘is the only one to be aﬀected by the selection of the
independent auditor.’’ He added: ‘‘of course, the question involves the col-
lusion of the Auditor w i t ht h eO ﬃ c e r sa sw e l la sa m o n gt h eO ﬃ c e r st h e m -
selves.’’ Evidently, the policy of rotating audit ﬁrms betrayed a generalized
suspicion of plots and conspiracies. Perhaps the du Pont family (and certain
old hands) were not entirely comfortable with third-party professionals in
their midst.
W.S. Carpenter, now arguing in favor of the need to obtain a fresh per-
spective, said he supported occasional auditor rotation. In a letter dated March
28, 1938 to Donaldson Brown, the Vice Chairman of the board of General
Motors, Carpenter, then a Du Pont Vice President and Chairman of the
powerful ﬁnance committee, expressed the following view:
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should not be too easy and comfortable. I would rather see it vig-
orous and aggressive, not merely for the purpose of trying to stir
up trouble or to make a show of activity, but rather for the purpose
of re-examining at all times what is being done to see that the best
practices known in the profession at all times are being employed.
Accountancy as we know is not an exact science. There are many
things in accountancy which cannot be adjudged right or wrong.
It is quite natural that, as the years pass, the work of the various
accounting ﬁrms becomes more or less formalized. They accept cer-
tain practices as being correct or incorrect, whereas, in fact, that is
probably not true. It seems to me, for that reason, that occasionally
we should have a rotation in order that the practices which we have
been following, perhaps for years, are re-examined periodically
from the viewpoint of a somewhat diﬀerent philosophy. The eﬀect
of this also on our organization I think is good.
We have been going on for many years with the same auditors
[PW]. I see the same faces down here year after year until I, in fact,
get them confused with our own organization. I do not question
their honesty, but I do question somewhat their capacity for con-
stantly, aggressively, opening and reopening questions about theo-
ries and practices which we are following.
The public audit is an expensive procedure and is in a way a trou-
blesome one from the standpoint of the organization, but for all of
this expense and trouble I believe we should endeavor to get in re-
turn something which is beneﬁcial to us besides a mere check on our
accounts to determine that no fraud exists. I believe the best way of
doing this is by occasionally getting a review and re-examination of
our practices.
Carpenters strong view in favor of occasional audit ﬁrm rotation in 1938
may seem to be at variance from the perfunctory view he expressed in 1922, but
in 1922 the discussion was over changing the audit ﬁrm each year, not every
several years. Also, in 1922 his motivation may have been to lend support to
the opinion held by his Comptroller, J.B. Eliason. Carpenters advocacy of
occasional audit ﬁrm rotation was so marked that his biographer, when dis-
cussing Carpenters position on rotation in 1938, has written: ‘‘At Walters
urging the company changed auditors three times in the next decade before his
retirement [as President in 1948]’’ (Cheape, 1995, p. 90). As noted above,
Carpenter became President in 1940.
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were replaced in 1943 by Arthur Andersen & Co. Andersen served until 1946,
when Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery became the auditors. Reﬂecting
Carpenters view, Du Pont thus reverted to a policy of rotating auditors over
a shorter span of years than in the case of PW during the 1930s.
4. Issues raised by Du Pont’s auditors in the 1940s
One might have supposed that a reason for Du Ponts policy of rotating its
audit ﬁrm was to escape unpleasant disagreements with the auditor. There is no
evidence that this was the case. In 1929, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
concluding the ﬁrst of its two years as Du Ponts audit ﬁrm, did not ostensibly
qualify its opinion published in Du Ponts annual report,
12 yet it recom-
mended in a separate report to the company that the single surplus account
shown in its balance sheet be segregated by source, including a designation of
the portion attributable to undistributed earnings.
13 Even though Du Pont did
not accept the recommendation, the ﬁrm was reappointed for a second year. As
will be brought out in the next section, Arthur Andersen & Co. qualiﬁed its
opinion in all three of its years as Du Pont auditor during the 1940s, yet its
term as auditor did not seem to be aﬀected.
4.1. Arthur Andersen & Co. qualiﬁes its opinion, and Du Pont replies
The foregoing roster of Du Ponts audit ﬁrms over the years indicates that
two ﬁrms served after PW in shorter multi-year engagements between 1939 and
1945: Haskins & Sells and Arthur Andersen & Co. Of the two, the Arthur
Andersen (‘‘AA’’) engagement was the more confrontational. In Du Ponts
12 At least, no explicit qualiﬁcation was signiﬁed. Yet the ﬁrms opinion was curiously equivocal.
It said only that ‘‘the attached Consolidated Balance Sheet, Income and Surplus Accounts have
been prepared [from the books and accounts] and, in our opinion, present the consolidated
ﬁnancial position at December 31st, 1928, and the results of the operations for the year.’’ Identical
wording was used in the audit report given the following year. The ﬁrm did not use a qualitative
adverb, such as ‘‘correctly’’ or ‘‘properly,’’ whose inclusion in auditors opinions of the day was
common (see Himmelblau, 1927, pp. 47–48). In the ﬁrms opinion on the ﬁnancial statements for
1928 and 1929 of General Electric Company, another major Peat, Marwick client, it stated that the
ﬁnancial statements ‘‘correctly record’’ the results of the operations and the condition of its aﬀairs.
Peat, Marwicks audit reports for Du Pont and General Electric were both issued from its New
York City oﬃce, at 40 Exchange Place. One supposes that the ﬁrm would have developed common
criteria for major audits based in the same oﬃce.
13 Although Peat, Marwicks separate report has not survived, Walter Carpenter replied to the
ﬁrm, in a letter dated May 24, 1929, in which he defended the companys practice with respect to
surplus.
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qualiﬁed its report. AA disagreed with Du Ponts practice of not allocating the
balance in its combined surplus account to earned surplus, paid-in surplus, and
surplus arising from revaluation of assets, and in this respect it took a stronger
position than did Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. in 1929. In an internal
memorandum to Du Pont, the ﬁrm showed how the allocation should be
performed. But Du Pont was unconvinced. In a three-page statement ap-
pearing immediately after AAs audit report, Du Ponts committee on audit,
composed of members of the board of directors who did not occupy a position
in the companys active management, rejected the grounds for AAs exception.
The committee contended that any such allocation would be arbitrary and very
likely inaccurate; furthermore, the committee said that a segregation of surplus
by source was irrelevant for determining the availability of dividends under the
Delaware corporation law. Since the inception of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1934, it has been rare for the auditor of a U.S. company to
qualify its opinion (other than for uncertainties), but it has been rarer still for
a U.S. company to respond publicly to such an exception. (AAs audit report
and Du Ponts reply are reproduced in an appendix.)
So unusual was this event that The Journal of Accountancy reprinted both the
auditors report and the companys reply, and, in an editorial in the same issue,
the Journal praised the two parties for providing a full disclosure of their ir-
reconcilable diﬀerences (When Accountant and Client Disagree, 1944). Leonard
Spacek, then a partner in AAs Chicago oﬃce, later recalled that ‘‘it was great
publicity,’’ showing that the ﬁrm stood on principle (Spacek, 1989, p. 62).
14
AA also took exception for the same reason in the 1944 and 1945 annual
reports. The audit committees statement was not repeated, but in the 1944
report (as in its predecessor) the Chairman of the board and the President, in
their letter to the stockholders, said that the company could not accept the
auditors view. One might suppose that Du Pont would not have reappointed
AA after the clash of views exhibited in the 1943 annual report, but in fact AA
remained the auditor for two more years and, as noted, did not back down
from its stated belief that the combined surplus should be apportioned into
three classes.
4.2. Lybrands also qualiﬁes its opinion, but on another matter
In 1946, Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery (‘‘Lybrands’’) became the Du
Pont auditor, and it continued to serve for a total of eight years. In Du Ponts
14 In his oral history, Spacek (1989, pp. 60–63) confused Du Ponts use of the equity method of
accounting for its investment in General Motors with the dispute over the allocation of the
combined surplus.
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combined surplus but said that it lacked ‘‘a deﬁnitive and authoritative basis
upon which to predicate retrospective allocations of the various charges and
credits which have been made to surplus since incorporation of the Company,’’
and it did not qualify its opinion on the ﬁnancial statements. In the 1947 an-
nual report, Lybrands did qualify its opinion, because the company had made
a charge against net income for ‘‘excessive construction costs’’ occasioned by
the postwar inﬂation. The extra charge was 17% of Du Ponts net income. Du
Pont was one of several prominent manufacturing corporations to make such a
supplemental charge for rising costs (see Blough, 1947; Notable Deviations
from Accounting Principles, 1948). Provisions such as this, which excited
controversy within the accounting profession, were disapproved by the Com-
mittee on Accounting Procedure (Depreciation and High Costs, 1948) and by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (Blough, 1949, p. 65). After the SEC
acted to disallow the practice, Du Pont chose to record ‘‘accelerated depreci-
ation’’ on historical cost in 1948.
It is curious that none of Du Ponts auditors publicly took exception to its
location of Reserve for Depreciation and Obsolescence on the liabilities side of
the balance sheet, rather than as a subtraction from Plants and Properties on
the asset side. The company explained, ‘‘Our depreciation and obsolescence
reserve is much more in the nature of a contingency reserve to provide for
obsolescence than an indication of reduction in the value of our plants.’’
15 The
company cited an article in the accounting literature as support for its aberrant
practice (Simon, 1959), although its practice antedated the article by decades.
Lybrands continued as Du Ponts audit ﬁrm through 1953, a tenure of eight
years. One supposes, therefore, that Crawford H. Greenewalt, who succeeded
Walter Carpenter as President in 1948, did not share Carpenters view about
the frequency with which audit ﬁrms should be rotated.
5. Price, Waterhouse & Co. becomes Du Pont’s permanent auditor
Du Ponts policy of rotating audit ﬁrms ostensibly continued in 1954, when
PW once again became its auditor. Yet, as one retired PW audit partner re-
called, the ﬁrm was determined to persuade Du Pont to abandon its rotation
policy and retain PW as its permanent auditor.
16 Several years later, PW
15 Letter to the author from H.W. Evans, Treasurer, dated July 30, 1965.
16 Written transcript of the interview by Kathleen McDermott of Robert Hampton, III, May 31,
1989, p. 51, included in the PricewaterhouseCoopers Archive, housed in the Rare Book and
Manuscript Library, Columbia University. Hampton was a manager in the ﬁrms research
department from 1953 to 1961.
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the episode as follows:
When PW once again had the opportunity to serve as auditors [of
Du Pont], Paul Grady became deeply involved in the engagement,
and the Philadelphia oﬃce ‘‘put a lot of power on that job, into try-
ing to keep Du Pont happy.’’ The increased scale and complexity of
Du Ponts worldwide operations, the fact that very few auditing
ﬁrms could handle such work, and the tremendous eﬀort made by
PW and Gradys ‘‘ministrations’’ convinced Du Pont to end its ro-
tation policy and to remain permanently with PW (Allen and
McDermott, 1993, p. 146).
17
It is not known when Du Pont resolved to retain PW on a permanent basis,
but the decision is likely to have been taken by 1960, when Paul Grady retired
from the ﬁrm. A review of PWs audit reports on Du Ponts ﬁnancial state-
ments for the three decades following 1954 reveals that they all contained
unqualiﬁed opinions.
For its part, Du Ponts senior management was no longer dominated by a du
Pont. In January 1948, Lammot du Pont had resigned as board Chairman and
was succeeded by Walter Carpenter, who thereupon resigned as President. The
board chairmanship carried little authority and was largely a ceremonial po-
sition (Cheape, 1995, p. 229). Succeeding Carpenter as President, as noted
above, was Crawford Greenewalt, a distinguished scientist and previously a
company vice president. Greenewalt was married to Ir e en e ee du Ponts daughter.
Yet, even though both Carpenter and Greenewalt were within, or on the edge,
of the du Pont family, 1948 marked the ﬁrst year in which a du Pont was
neither Chairman nor President, although a clutch of du Ponts continued on
the companys board, which numbered more than 30 members. The du Pont
oligarchy was receding into the background and perhaps with it the sway of the
du Ponts concern about protecting against collusion among oﬃcers and even
with the external auditor.
6. Conclusion
Du Ponts policy of rotating audit ﬁrms, initially each year and then every
several years, was instituted so as to assure a disinterestedness on the part of
the auditor. Pierre S. du Pont was said to favor this policy, but his reasons are
not on the record. Ir e en e ee du Pont held the view that Du Ponts audit ﬁrm
17 Paul Grady, the senior technical partner in PWs executive oﬃce in New York City, was one
of the acknowledged leaders of the accounting profession.
12 S.A. Zeﬀ / Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22 (2003) 1–18should not be rendering other expert services to the Treasurers Department.
Lammot du Pont believed that the annual audit should be conducted by a ﬁrm
that had no involvement with the company during the immediately preceding
year. He seemed especially concerned to prevent or expose any collusion
among oﬃcers, and even the external auditor was not above suspicion. An-
other argument, advanced by Walter S. Carpenter, Jr., was that audit ﬁrm
rotation provided the company with a fresh perspective. By the 1950s, how-
ever, the du Ponts and Carpenter no longer held a senior management position
in the company. Following the reappointment of Price Waterhouse & Co. as
auditor in 1954, the ﬁrm succeeded in persuading Du Pont to allow it to remain
as the permanent auditor, especially in view of the increasing size and com-
plexity of the company and its extensive overseas operations.
18
The unique Du Pont experience with audit ﬁrm rotation teaches a lesson
today in view of questions that have been raised about the celebrated instances
of unduly congenial relations between auditors and client companies that have
been exposed in the media. One can almost argue that, in some of these audit
engagements, a state of virtual de facto collusion seemed to exist between the
auditor and the company. If that is so, one can reﬂect on Du Ponts concern of
more than a half century ago that decisive steps must be taken when setting the
terms of the audit engagement to assure that the auditor will assume a truly
independent posture, which is not compromised by its partners developing
overly familiar ties with company oﬃcers or board members. Whether the
rotation of the partners assigned to the audit engagement will achieve the same
result remains to be seen.
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compilation of rankings by size of the Big Eight public accounting ﬁrms in the United States,
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